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eNdemIC CorrupTIoN: prACTICAl NormS of The 
ruSSIAN sistema 
In his address to the Federation Council in December 2012, President 
Vladimir Putin pointed to the poor government efficiency and corrup-
tion as major problems that everyone can see and contrasted those 
with modern public administration. The same month, Russia assumed 
the chairmanship of the Group of 20 (G-20) and, at its September 2013 
meeting, urged the member states to adopt a joint anticorruption strat-
egy that would ban officials from traveling from one country to another 
if they are suspected of corruption (IMRussia.org 2013). Such rhetoric 
could be seen as a response to Russia’s less than satisfactory position 
in the international ratings. In 2012, Transparency International (TI) 
ranked Russia 133rd out of 174 countries on its Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), and last place out of 22 in the latest TI Bribe Payer Index 
(BPI).1 Yet analysts also point out that an anticorruption rhetoric in 
countries with endemic corruption is often politically motivated and 
instrumentally used. Thus, Putin has reportedly taken over the anticor-
ruption grounds of the opposition (Panfilova in Bruk 2013). The popula-
tion welcomes the anticorruption stand but does not expect tangible 
results in reducing corruption levels. In response to the 2013 Global 
Corruption Barometer survey, 70 percent of Russians stated that the 
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government is ineffective or very ineffective in fighting corruption. 
Moreover, when asked, “To what extent is this country’s government 
run by a few big interests looking out for themselves?” only 3 percent of 
respondents showed confidence in the government, while 73 percent 
believed that the government is run according to the interests of its 
members (expert opinion is even more pessimistic).2 
Similar data can be found in other countries with endemic 
corruption—that is, countries where corrupt behavior is perceived as 
a practical norm, whereas noncorrupt behavior is perceived as a devia-
tion. In the example above, the practical norm is an expectation that 
the government officials serve their own interests and enrichment, 
while the deviation is to serve the interests of the population (public 
good). The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer data on Russia highlight 
the perception of government officials as wealth-grabbers and the 
importance of personal contacts and relationships to get things done. 
Only 6 percent of Russian respondents said that contacts were of no 
or little importance and 73 percent considered contacts important or 
very important, while a further 16 percent considered them moder-
ately important (the scores are relatively high for the United States and 
Germany; see GCR 2013).3 
The data of the 2011 online survey in 46 regions of Russia indi-
cate that only 18 percent consider it inappropriate to use connections 
(blat networks) for career purposes; 25 percent believe that it is impos-
sible to make a career without connections, and 54 percent acknowl-
edged having used connections for their own careers because they 
had no alternative. The perception of the importance of connections 
for finding a good job is even higher, at 68 percent (NEWSru.com 2011). 
In present-day Russia, the role and importance of personal contacts is 
linked to Putin’s control, or micromanagement, but also to the grip 
of patrimonial rule and traditional forms of governance, sometimes 
referred to as sistema (Ledeneva 2013). 
To explore the role of personal networks in Putin’s sistema, I 
conducted ethnographic research on the patterns of governance that 
are often associated with and conceptualized as Russia’s neopatrimo-
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nialism, competitive particularism, personalized bureaucracy, “manual 
steering” regime, or political corruption.4 Rather than discussing 
Russia’s anticorruption reforms and the related rhetoric of the coun-
try’s leadership, widely perceived as ineffective and instrumentally 
used, I identify the patterns of governance that are effective—that 
enable sistema to work—and consider their potential, limitations, and 
implications. I argue that in order to exercise power under conditions 
of endemic corruption, a government official must become an expe-
rienced broker of sistema, stay in control of power networks, moni-
tor their dynamics, and apply instruments of informal checks and 
balances. Leadership implies mastery of both the methods applicable 
in official hierarchical contexts and the tools that are effective and 
efficient within informal power networks, which, despite their seem-
ing incompatibility, merge seamlessly in the hands of such a master. 
The literature on informal governance is somewhat limited; leadership 
theories tend to examine practices of informal management under 
the rubric of interpersonal skills rather than associate them with the 
nature of organization. I argue that methods of informal governance 
deserve more systematic and in-depth analysis of sistema.
puTIN oN SISTemA
During the Valdai Discussion Club event in September 2005, I asked 
President Putin a question about corruption within the Kremlin walls. 
I stated that previous heads of the Russian state were known to rely 
on their security services for gathering and keeping sensitive informa-
tion (kompromat files) on their staff, friends and enemies, and asked the 
president what information he sought and used on a regular basis with 
regard to corruption. I also wondered whether there was an anticorrup-
tion strategy at the presidential level. As with the majority of questions, 
Putin took his time answering it. According to my notes, he expressed 
some surprise that I asked about the Kremlin, as budgetary alloca-
tions were decided elsewhere. He also pointed out that the problem of 
corruption resides not in people but in the system. Therefore, targeting 
people with kompromat is ineffective. One must target the system, and 
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that can only be done against the background of economic growth and 
political stability. 
Naturally, I was intrigued by Putin’s reference to sistema and 
pondered over his elusive answer. It was so clear, logical, and “right” 
that political stability sounded like the best anticorruption solution. 
In accordance with the presidential line of incremental change, requir-
ing improvement in economic growth, effective law enforcement, and 
stability of the political system, some other Kremlin officials have justi-
fied Putin’s “manual steering” by emphasizing that currently Russia 
cannot rely on the institutions of civil society or any institutionalized 
system of checks and balances: “As these institutions gradually develop 
in Russia we must hope that those in power will exercise self-restraint, 
which of course cannot be guaranteed. In the majority of cases, those in 
power are guided by their best intentions . . .” 
Deciding whether institutional deficiencies create the demand 
for manual control or whether manual control restricts the develop-
ment of institutional capacity is the chicken-egg dilemma. In Putin’s 
Russia, manual control is guided by best intentions, but the “right” 
outcomes are achieved by the use of administrative resources and 
manipulation, especially when it comes to the issues of political stabil-
ity, party politics, and control of the media. Another senior official, one 
my interviewees for the study of sistema, said that
people have no set political preferences—television decides 
everything. A party’s popularity can be boosted from zero 
up to 30 percent. We need time for these political prefer-
ences to develop but, while they are emerging, it’s manual 
control. What does Putin think? There are no assets which 
belong to no one: if the state does not control the media, 
big business will control them. Putin thinks, yes, manual 
control costs us, yes, this is unfortunate politically, and yes, 
I get criticized for it. But for the time being, however, I have 
no other way. . . . What else can I do if people are ready to 
vote for a populist?
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Putin’s manual control is somewhat consistent with the modus 
operandi of the Soviet administrative system, where all branches 
of power, including executive, judicial, legislative, and media, were 
guided by the “party line.” When asked whether he was not afraid of 
micromanaging Russia, Putin said: 
It is impossible to govern a country like Russia effectively 
in the micromanagement mode. I can tell you that it is 
impossible to govern any country in the micromanage-
ment mode, a small Luxembourg or any other country, 
not only an independent country but also any region. A 
system is required. But where the system does not work, 
one cannot be sitting back with one’s arms folded or pick-
ing one’s nose and say: well, the system is not working, 
therefore, we are sorry. Personal involvement is needed 
here. And one should not be afraid of responsibility (BBC 
Monitoring 2010).
This statement is an example of Putin’s rhetoric—there should be an 
effective system of governance in Russia as in any other country—but it 
is also an illustration of his leadership style. He comes across as a hands-
on leader, unafraid of personal involvement where needed or of taking 
responsibility for it. In interviews, sistema insiders also comment on 
Putin’s hands-on management skills and the real power they generate: 
Putin has changed every few years but his method has 
remained the same: “manual steering out” (ruchnoe razru-
livanie). He engages in conflict resolution and makes 
sure that his decisions are accepted. In contrast to Prime 
Minister Medvedev, who would not make a phone call, 
Putin calls and says, “Do it like this.” Issues inevitably end 
up on his desk, especially sensitive issues and those involv-
ing key players. This is why he remains at the steering 
wheel. 
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The scale of Putin’s personal involvement, his reliance on power 
networks, and his choice of management instruments are impor-
tant for understanding the governance system in Russia. Apart from 
general assumptions that Putin’s manual control is a form of neopat-
rimonialism, not conducive to the separation of powers and effective-
ness of institutions, our understanding of the patrimonial power and 
the workings of patron-client networks remains fairly limited, despite 
Kremlinologists’ decades-long interest in informal power. Let us start 
with a brief summary of traditional governance patterns in Russia: 
“feeding” (kormlenie), joint responsibility (krugovaya poruka), and the use 
of formal façades (potemkinskie derevni) that deviate from how things 
really are.
poWer NeTWorkS ANd The orIgINS of INformAl  
goVerNANCe
In the late middle ages the term “feeding” was used to describe a 
method by which Russian rulers rewarded the military and government 
elite with exclusive rights to temporarily exploit regional constituen-
cies for private needs. Usually the rewarded official spent a few years 
running the constituency (the size and wealth of which reflected the 
person’s closeness to the Moscow ruler), filled his coffers, and returned 
to the court to resume military or administrative service. Although the 
official had almost unlimited power over the constituency there were 
some unwritten rules that regulated the types and amount of “feeds” 
he could extract from the managed territory. The center also informally 
watched him and expected some share of the bounty. As a Russian joke 
has it, state officials are caught not for stealing but for stealing too 
much for their rank.
In addition to collecting direct taxes in the form of products 
and labor from the constituency, the public servant imposed levies on 
all administrative services he and his men performed for the popula-
tion—from opening a criminal investigation to registering a marriage. 
According to Russian historian Vasily Kluchevsky, feeding was meant 
to be a reward to the disinterested public servants who did good for 
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their country, but in practice it made Russian officials accustomed to 
the tribute for their services (Klyuchevsky 1988, 316). Public services 
became seen as an opportunity to receive salary, or prebend, in Max 
Weber’s terms.5 The legacy of feeding as the life-support system for 
officials—who quite literally “fed” from their place in the state hier-
archy—lasted well beyond the 1555 decree on the abolition of feeding 
and other land reforms initiated by Ivan IV (the Terrible), which made 
the practice illegal but did not eradicate it. As a result, feeding gave way 
to stealing, which spread among state officials and beyond as a practi-
cal, if semi-legitimate, norm. This practical norm is captured in Nikolai 
Karamzin’s remark “one steals” (voruyut) and widespread perceptions of 
Russia as a kleptocracy. 
On the individual level, the logic of giving (being given an oppor-
tunity to feed) merged with the logic of taking (taking an opportunity 
to feed), especially under socialism, where the give-and-take practices 
were exercised at the expense of state property or public resources 
(Lovell et al. 2000). On the state level, the give-and-take practices have 
consolidated into a Soviet version of feeding, an economic model 
based on centralized redistribution of resources and ideological reluc-
tance to introduce market principles of allocation at the expense of 
Russia’s natural resources (Polanyi 1977; Bessonova 1999). The person-
alized system of allocation, the culture of privileges, and the redistri-
bution principles have promulgated free-riding, which became most 
pronounced in Putin’s Russia in the form of kickbacks and sistema raid-
ing (acts of depriving business owners of their business using threats 
of state persecution, often covered with the rhetoric of patriotism) 
(Ledeneva 2013). 
Joint responsibility (krugovaya poruka) is yet another traditional 
form of governance in Russia, where one is responsible for all and all 
are responsible for one. It is best imagined as signing a petition in a 
circle so that it is not clear who signed it first, thus protecting the trou-
blemaker while making the whole community liable. The Russian state 
used krugovaya poruka for tax collection, army conscription, and crime 
control. Whenever the peasant community was not able to deliver 
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payment, a recruit, or a criminal, the whole community was punished. 
Pressed together vis-à-vis the state, peasant communities enforced vigi-
lance, informal punishment, and peer control that limited individual 
rights for the sake of collective well-being (Ledeneva in Markova 2004). 
Krugovaya poruka was formally abolished as part of the liberal reforms by 
Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin in 1903 (in effect from 1905), yet in prac-
tice it continued to mold people’s strategies of survival in the face on 
an oppressive state, on the one hand, and rulers’ reliance on traditional 
forms of control in unmanageable or unstable settings, on the other. An 
archive-based study of networks of regional elites provides insight into 
the role of krugovaya poruka in the workings of Soviet sistema (Gorlizki 
2010; Khlevnyuk 2009). Among regional elites, it was used for resist-
ing control and orders from above. Krugovaya poruka was used to cover 
up for power excesses by regional officials; to protect an official when 
compromising information about him was leaked to the center; and 
to punish the whistleblowers leaking such information (Hosking in 
Markova 2004; Ledeneva 2006). The immunity and protection provided 
by krugovaya poruka, however, was intrinsically linked to the limited 
property rights and the dependence on the group, the so-called lock-in 
effect, for individuals. 
The use of the gap between the formal façades and the informal 
workings of power, metaphorically grasped in the phrase “Potemkin 
villages,” is the third feature of traditional governance. Historically, 
Potemkin villages are associated with the legend of creative accounting 
by Count Potemkin, who built façades of fake villages along the jour-
neying path of Catherine the Great, as well as with the virtual nature of 
postcommunist reforms and privatization (Wilson 2005; Allina-Pisano 
2007), but there are further important implications. The importance 
of distinguishing façades from what is behind them is an important 
practical norm grasped in such popular wisdom as “Russia is a coun-
try of unread laws and unwritten rules” or “the imperfection of our 
laws is compensated for by their nonobservance” (nesovershenstvo nashikh 
zakonov kompensiruetsya ikh nevypolneniem). Russian cultural tradition 
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separates the concept of justice from that of formal law, which is high-
lighted by the diverging connotations of the words spravedlivost (justice) 
and zakonnost (lawfulness). The duality of norms, the gap between the 
formal and informal, and the arbitrary nature of their application make 
the practical norms indispensable know-how. 
In his study of Muscovite Political Folkways, Edward Keenan explains 
this gap between the informal and the formal in terms of political 
culture. He argues that Russian political culture has been strongly influ-
enced over time by both the psychological attitudes and the practical, 
adaptive techniques that were developed by the earliest Slavic settlers. 
The economic and social conditions that they faced—isolation, poor 
land, severe climate, unpredictable harvests, and a generally hostile 
environment—gave rise to a vigorous culture with specific traits: 
caution, calculation, resoluteness, stoicism, endurance, and above all, 
an emphasis on survival. Over the centuries, Keenan claims, these traits 
constituted the enduring elements of Russian political culture: the 
operational basis of each setting is informal and traditional (there is 
a lack of connection between real power and formal status); decision 
making is “corporate and conspiratorial”; stability and risk-avoidance 
are favored over innovation and progress; and there is a reluctance to 
promulgate systematic codified law (those who need to know the rules 
know them). The last point is particularly important as it indicates the 
fluid nature of rule enforcement and the runaway nature of unwritten 
rules (Ledeneva 2001).6
Historian Geoffrey Hosking emphasizes the role of personal 
power networks, defined as hierarchical relationship between patrons 
and clients, and views them as the main pillars of governance during 
both czarist and Soviet Russia. He identifies foundations of the patron-
client relationships in imperial Russia, such as kinship, geographical 
location, and institutional position, which drew together those who 
had worked in the same office, especially if the office had special-
ist functions, such as the State Chancery or the Ministries of Justice 
or Finance (Hosking 2000). Hosking argues that the Russian political 
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system cannot be characterized as purely autocratic; one has to look 
upon the Russian political system under czarist rule and the Soviet 
nomenklatura as being a stately network of personal power, with marked 
elements of patronage and clientelism that carry through to the pres-
ent-day Russian state. 
Political scientists Thomas Christiansen and Simona Piattoni 
point to the double-faced nature of clientelism—practically expedi-
ent but normatively suspect—and its implications for corruption. 
Clientelism is often used to denote all long-term, mutually convenient 
(although not fully legitimate) deals that restrict competition within 
closed circles. These deals are not fully legitimate precisely because 
they tend to limit the selection of partners to preestablished groups 
of “friends” who may have a common interest in exploiting some 
available pool of public resources and keeping the outsiders out. But 
they may also be explained by the simple convenience of not having 
to renegotiate the terms of long-term relationships based on mutual 
knowledge and trust (Christiansen and Piattoni 2003). In other words, 
clientelism is premised on assumptions very similar to those that 
sustain the networks through which informal governance typically 
works. Patron-client relationships offer modest but definite benefits 
to the clients but they also carry potential dangers. Christiansen 
and Piattoni draw attention to the lack of sanctions and enforceable 
procedures, which generates corruption and nepotism, as well as the 
necessity for formal hierarchies to undermine the networks’ cred-
ibility and legitimacy in order to sustain and boost their power. The 
potentially damaging symbiosis of hierarchies and power networks 
highlights both the question of legitimacy of informal governance 
and the dilemma between legitimacy and efficiency of informal gover-
nance. Power networks tend to create effective yet illegitimate short-
cuts that undermine efficiency and legitimacy of formal institutional 
channels. 
All three constituents of traditional governance rely on specific 
patterns that are particularist, arbitrary, noncodified, and nontranspar-
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ent. As the Russian prime minister, Sergei Witte, summed it up at the 
end of the nineteenth century:
 
I am not in the least afraid of foreign capital, since I consider 
it is in the interests of our country. No country has been 
developed without foreign capital. What I am afraid of is 
just the opposite—that our way of doing things has such 
specific characteristics, so different from the way things 
are done in civilized countries that not many foreigners 
will want to do business with us (quoted from Ledeneva 
2001).
The level of “specificity” in the ways of getting things done increased 
during the Soviet days. In his contribution to the Leading Russia volume, 
Robert Service explains the difficulty of dealing with the Soviet system 
because of the “schizoid nature of the USSR,” stemming from the 
ambivalence of its central control, clientelist politics, widespread infor-
mal practices, misinformation going upward and downward, and popu-
lar cynicism (Service 2005, 71). In the contemporary Russian hybrid 
regime, where elements of traditional governance and representative 
democracy are intertwined with Putin’s power over his networks, 
instruments of informal governance are obscured even further. Such 
instruments of creating informal incentives and allocating resources 
(feeding), of monitoring and controlling through informal checks and 
balances (joint responsibility), and of sustaining façades of indepen-
dent institutions while controlling them informally (Potemkin villages) 
require detailed examination. 
meThodS of INformAl goVerNANCe IN puTIN’S ruSSIA
I distinguish four ideal types of power networks that operate in differ-
ent modes or capacities: inner circle, useful friends, core contacts, 
and mediated contacts. The inner circle serves to back up a leader and 
to “program,” “filter,” and “develop” the power network. Useful friends 
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benefit from “authorized” business opportunities outside the power 
hierarchy (vertikal) and generate resources for the survival of the power 
network and/or increasing its financial base. Core contacts are more 
likely to benefit from public appointments within the power hierar-
chy and serve as safeguards of both the hierarchy’s and the network’s 
interests. Mediated contacts are used for outreaching, controlling, and 
channeling changes. These functions are linked to the key governance 
patterns predominant in periods of stability in Russian history, as iden-
tified by Keenan above: 
4 The operational basis of the inner circle is informal and tradi-
tional—that is, based on time/space proximity to the center of 
power and its privileges (the inner circle is defined on the basis of 
loyalty to/strength of ties with the leader).
4 Access to resources is decided on a corporate and conspiratorial 
basis; that is, patrons either provide clients (useful friends) with 
opportunities or allocate resources in exchange for corporate 
participation and undisclosed returns. 
4 Core contacts prioritize personal loyalty, stability, and risk avoid-
ance over professionalism and innovation, thus securing a binding 
force and ensuring the reproduction of sistema.
4 Mediated contacts benefit from affiliation with power networks 
and contribute to sustaining the dependence on and compliance 
with the unwritten rules. The nontransparency of sistema gener-
ates possibilities for rent-seeking, manipulation of rules, and unfair 
advantages for insiders, as well as fear and dissatisfaction among 
them. 
In what follows I present these ideal types and functions of power 
networks and link them to the leadership tasks and instruments of 
informal governance in figure 1 (Ledeneva 2013). 
On the basis of evidence articulated by my respondents, quoted 
in this article, and witness statements in the Russian cases in London 
courts, I assemble some reflections on the instruments of informal 
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governance and consider them in the order: informal incentives, infor-
mal affiliations, informal agendas, and informal signals.
INformAl INCeNTIVeS
The inner circle is associated with those participating in decision 
making and filtering of information. They are especially attuned 
to positive and negative incentives applied informally. Members of 
Putin’s inner circle are perceived to be generously rewarded in a 
material sense but the channels are totally nontransparent. As stated 
by a respondent,
There is an inner circle (svoi) in the top layer of state offi-
cials. Naturally, they do not take any kickbacks or have 
anything to do with business; they are rewarded through 
insider channels. It is fair to pay them to a decent level, 
equivalent to a few million in US dollars a year. These 
salaries/bonuses come from svoi funds, some unofficial 
coffers, perhaps those collected from businesses or from 
figure 1: Types and functions of power Networks, leadership Tasks, and 
Instruments of Informal governance
Network type: inner circle
Functions: backup/free-riding
Leadership task: vision and agenda-
setting
Methods of informal governance: 
informal incentives
Network type: core contacts
Functions: safety net/lock-in effect 
Leadership task: control and policy 
implementation
Methods of informal governance: 
informal agendas
Network type: useful friends
Functions: survival kit/limited rights 
Leadership task: resources control
Methods of informal governance: 
informal affiliations
Network type: mediated contacts 
Functions: buffer effect/path depen-
dence 
Leadership task: legitimation, stability 
and succession
Methods of informal governance: 
informal signals
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the political funds. It is important that people like this do 
not consider themselves relatively deprived because there 
are officials who make serious money in the private sector. 
Everyone knows vice premiers who own metallurgical 
complexes or fly in their own jets; there are also ministers 
who fly in their own jets and even heads of various ministe-
rial departments who fly in their own jets. Somehow this is 
accepted—there are certain agreements and sistema stays 
rather open-minded about all this.
Positive incentives are not unrelated to negative ones. One hears 
about certain dependencies, vulnerabilities, and informal hooks kept 
for the insiders of power networks, thus enhancing their participa-
tion, collective responsibility (krugovaya poruka), and compliance. For 
example, federal leaders can if necessary resort to the use of infor-
mal leverage to increase manageability of regional leaders (their core 
contacts), control their policies, and make them support important 
initiatives. An informal mobilization of resources can also be effec-
tive. “I do not rule out that Mr. Abramovich may take part in one of 
these projects,” Putin said in televised comments. “Let him open his 
wallet a little. It’s no big deal—he won’t feel a pinch. He has plenty of 
money” (Parfitt 2010, 5).
In my conversation with a sistema insider about the manage-
ment of resources for informal governance, otherwise known as black 
coffers, I asked a Borat-type question—“Isn’t this corrupt?”—and heard 
yet another story on how blurred the boundaries between the public 
and the private in Russia are:
I would not call such party funding corrupt. This money is 
not going into private pockets; it is used for stabilizing the 
situation. . . . . Well, naturally it ends up in some people’s 
pockets as well. Generally, such “political” funds cover up 
for corrupt financial flow because these funds, set up on 
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a semi-official basis by that department, are nontranspar-
ent. None of the donors in Gazprom, Rosneft, or Transneft, 
who do their homework and bring their millions, in actu-
ally know where it all goes, who has got what and what for. 
This is not their question. 
Some of the rewards for the contributions of inner circle 
members are nonmaterial. According to a number of respondents, the 
insiders appreciate trust extended to them and respond with coopera-
tion, loyalty, and drive. One of the most special rewards is the sense 
of belonging. The informal power is associated with personal relation-
ships, direct access, and “horizontal” proximity to a boss in a social 
network. Patterns of informal affiliation both support and subvert the 
workings of formal hierarchies. As an instrument of informal gover-
nance, however, informal affiliations are associated with access to the 
administrative resource. 
INformAl AffIlIATIoNS
State intervention in business is evidently a reflection of Putin’s “hands-
on” leadership style. “One has to see this through the prism of Putin’s 
attitude to business,” ventures a business lobbyist; “he doesn’t like 
it” (see Belkovskii and Golyshev 2006 for an opposite view). In theory, 
businessmen determine their own goals, implement their own busi-
ness decisions, and resolve their own problems. If they make a profit, 
it is also their own. In Putin’s sistema, property rights remain weak 
and delegation, associated with the democratic leadership style, is rare. 
However, informal alliances between state officials and businessmen, 
between the leaders and their “useful friends,” are perceived to be 
mutually beneficial. I call them informal affiliations, borrowing from 
Daniel Goleman’s definition of affiliative leadership style as one that 
connects people, focuses on them rather than on a task, and creates a 
favorable environment for productive behavior of the followers rather 
than directs their behavior (Goleman 2000).
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Putin thinks businessmen are opportunists who let down 
anybody for money, and he has a point, at least in relation 
to some people. Top businesses have all adjusted and do not 
go into politics. Some have deeper agreements than others, 
but overall, all businesses are tied up into power networks 
one way or another and they pay their dues, complete their 
home assignments [that is, contribute cash to designated 
funds], and finance pet projects. This makes them feel 
confident. When their interests cross with some of Putin’s 
insiders it creates serious problems for businessmen, who 
often end up losing part or all of their business. But the top 
thirty businessmen in Russia are not so simple, and they 
do have teeth, so they find ways to work with Putin’s inner 
circle. This leads to some spectacular binary partnerships: 
one takes up the responsibility for the political resource, 
the other takes up the rest. 
By “deeper agreements” the respondent may have meant the 
practices of cover-up or “home assignments” based on informal affili-
ations between businessmen and top state officials. Some examples of 
such practices are referred to in the Forbes investigation of Suleiman 
Kerimov for allegedly assembling assets into the presidential “pension 
fund” (Forbes 2012). 
The outcome of these partnerships is the system of mutual feed-
ing, characterized by the lack of clear boundaries between public and 
private, privileged access to resources and limited property rights, 
stifled competition, and uncontrolled capital flows.
There is one problem with informal affiliations and infor-
mal capital flows. The banks receive formal guarantees but, 
at the end of the day, everything is done with a handshake. 
If you lose your job, you might lose it all. Leadership jobs 
are not much fun. Business leaders get up in the morning 
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and run like hamsters on a treadmill, dealing with ambas-
sadors, orphans, and meetings, and there is no end to it. In 
the meantime, cash accumulates in the accounts of affili-
ated persons, nominal directors, remote relatives, various 
nephews, and who knows who else. This creates a problem: 
one wants to be able to spend some of it and have a life at 
the end of the tunnel, but at the same time it is difficult 
to get out of sistema and secure control of the informal 
income.
Informal affiliates cannot do without Putin, because their own 
fortunes are not fully legitimate. In a comment to the newspaper 
Vedomosti, Sergei Petrov, a Duma deputy from the Just Russia party 
and founder of the Rolf Group, draws parallels between Putin’s and 
Brezhnev’s situations.
Vladimir Putin is hostage to the political dead end he 
himself created. It is very similar to the trap that former 
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev set for himself and the coun-
try. If we assume, for one second, that Putin does want to 
radically modernize and liberalize his autocratic system—
or even retire if he so desired—he would not be allowed to 
do so by the elite who surround him. This is the elite who 
believe the government to be their personal property. After 
betraying his role as a guarantor of the constitution, Putin 
has effectively become a guarantor of corruption—he guar-
antees the financial well-being of millions of bureaucrats, 
government employees, and well-connected businesspeo-
ple (Petrov 2011, 8).
The corrupt implications of officials functioning simultaneously 
in their public-serving, network-serving, and self-serving capacities 
can only partially be reduced by legislative measures. I refer here to 
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the issues of the public-private crossover, the conflict of interest of the 
state officials, and the blurred boundaries between personal relation-
ships and the use of personal relationships.6 The main problem is not 
the lack of legislative deterrents or anticorruption campaigns. The 
problem is that these measures do not work in endemically corrupt 
environments, and the gap between the façades and inner workings of 
institutions continues to exist, while the methods of informal gover-
nance required for managing power networks in the Russian model 
effectively are neither discussed nor targeted directly. Such methods 
would amount to the social modernization of Russia, much more so 
than copying or transplanting institutions that work elsewhere. They 
would, however, require that the routine use of personal networks 
in inappropriate settings be acknowledged by policymakers, that the 
boundaries between public and private be subjected to scrutiny in 
public debates, and that the legacy of traditional forms of governance 
be reflected upon. The latter is especially important in the context of 
informal governance in present-day Russia and raising awareness of its 
positive and negative implications.
INformAl AgeNdAS
Politicians of all stripes pursue hidden agendas in addition to declared 
visions and goals. However, within sistema they not only become part 
of the politician’s permanent nature but serve as important manage-
ment instruments. When the government took control of both the 
NTV and ORT television networks, many commentators stated that 
the goal was to ensure state control over the mass media. Yet it was 
suggested to me by sistema insiders that, according to one, “there was 
a more important agenda behind these cases: ‘to clean the house,’ 
to eliminate a key kingmaker of Yeltsin’s time, Berezovsky, from 
sistema. I am fairly certain nobody stated it openly as a goal, but insid-
ers know how to read the signals.” Another respondent, a former 
government official, emphasized how informal agendas are pervasive 
in daily workings of the government:
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Deputies to the prime minister, the drivers of executive 
power, have to assess particular decisions with a view of 
their corrupt implications. Each decision is an arena for 
trade-offs, with its specific details reflecting the outcome  
of trade-offs between interests involved in the legislation in 
question. Two types of errors are possible: blocking a good 
decision and approving a bad decision. On the plus side, 
the sistema’s filters are such that where good decisions 
are blocked, the bad ones are not allowed through either, 
at least in theory. In practice, there are no checks and 
balances, no institutionalized or personalized opposition to 
the primary decision makers on the inside. Incompetence, 
lack of focus, and lack of professionalism in managers 
are also serious issues. It is a common view, widespread 
among government managers, that almost everyone can 
teach children and manage people. Some genuinely believe 
it, some are mimicking, and some demonstrate such an 
approach publicly while privately repudiating it. 
The culture of personal loyalty and patronage-based appoint-
ments—the personal network-based managerial culture—accounts for 
some instances of incompetence, which in turn reinforce the potential 
of informal governance. Particularly sensitive appointments are associ-
ated with informal financial flows. 
Let us look at the economy as a field of state budget cash 
flows that are up for grabs. Trusted people are appointed to 
control financial flows. As a rule, these people are profes-
sional, capable of organizing the technical side—this is the 
formal level on which things function. On another level, 
there are people who devise and push through certain 
financial schemes and chains of financial operations, such 
as signing off on value-added tax schemes. Of course, these 
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schemes are covered up by layers and layers of formal 
procedures: tenders, commissions, committees. When 
a scheme is constructed, it is dissociated from particular 
institutions: one has ordered nonexistent services, another 
has paid for them, yet another has executed delivery, and 
responsibility is dissolved in the process.
In other words, the state can be abused informally because it 
is seen as formally controlled, but the formal control is applied selec-
tively: there is room for discretion, for deciding where to look and 
where not to look. There is no informality if you do not look for it. But if 
you look for it, you go against sistema. Besides, law enforcement organs 
and the audit chamber are full of trusted people that ensure the state’s 
potential to turn into a predator. 
For businesses dealing with the state, informality is beneficial 
but also dangerous. Although the benefits of informal governance 
might present a solution to the problems of overlapping hierarchies 
or oversized organizations, the emerging gap between formal priori-
ties and priorities of various power networks creates problems, often 
associated with clashes of hidden interests, ambivalence, and conflict. 
Sistema wisdom has it that you should “Be ready to accept that you 
might never understand what brought you down.”
INformAl SIgNAlS
As illustrated in multiple Russian legal cases brought to London courts, 
informal governance in Putin’s Russia was essential in order to serve the 
key operational needs of sistema: to reallocate resources and control 
the financial flow; to implement policies and ensure the manageabil-
ity of formal institutions; as well as to maintain stability and initiate 
change. Informal signals serve as signposts of sistema trends; they flag 
changes in unwritten rules and give warnings of informal checks and 
balances being activated. One of my interviewees, a broker of sistema, 
links this particular mode of governance to the weakness of institu-
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tions, impotence of civil society, and parasitism of the population in 
Russia:
 
In Soviet times, and generally under sistema for the past 
300 years . . . people push responsibility onto anyone 
else—Putin, for example—so that he pays their electric-
ity and heating bills. Crowds love Putin. He is reliable; he 
accepts their undeveloped skills and laziness relative to 
other nations, allows long holidays—all while oil money 
covers up for this permissive attitude. It is impossible for 
people to understand that they are parasitic. The elites are 
satisfied with this state of affairs but worry about stabil-
ity. Parasitism contradicts modernity. Sistema faces both 
external pressures, such as the Olympics and competition 
in the international arena, and internal threats, such as the 
budget deficit, low revenues, and elites’ frustration with 
Putin. This is the puzzle. 
It is common to blame the Russians for their willingness to read 
informal signals, for self-censorship, and for not responding to any 
other leadership style than a “strong hand.” One hears repercussions of 
the “each nation deserves its leader” dictum rather often in interviews 
with Russian elites: the parasitic population deserves the “virtual” 
party politics; the crooked population deserves corrupt courts; the 
passive population deserves the “remotely controlled” television with 
its nonstop soap operas. “This is not just informal governance,” sighs 
an expert to whom I explain my interest in informal politics, “this is 
centralized informal governance” (emphasis added). He talks about the 
department of domestic politics of the Kremlin administration, once 
led by Vladislav Surkov:
All [political] parties receive money in a centralized way 
these days. It is impossible to secure party funding outside 
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sistema. Even communists must drag their supporters to 
somebody like Chesnakov, not the level of Surkov, so that 
they submit funds into a common fund, so that commu-
nists would get centralized support. This makes it very easy 
to control party leaders and direct party politics.
In Putin’s Russia, informal instruments are oriented on compliance. 
It has been said that not only do people prefer the comfort of receiv-
ing commands, since it frees them from responsibility, but they are 
also keen to seek them, to read signals and display compliance before 
the command is even given. Cults of personality patterns, information 
control, and manipulating succession are universal features of power 
(Shekshnia and Kets de Vries 2008), but in Russia they are justified by 
the very conditions that they create. Manual control governance is legit-
imized by the inefficiency of the formal institutions, while it under-
mines institutions and blocks their development. A former sistema 
insider explains the symbiotic nature of formal procedures and infor-
mal ways of circumventing them in sistema: 
Formal procedures are kept complex and overregulated 
so that one uses informal channels. Moreover, the system 
seems to sustain defects in formal rules at a level that 
would continue to feed those in positions to make deci-
sions. It is not even a choice for a bureaucrat but a prescrip-
tion. The key feature of this system is that an individual has 
no option but to develop a reflex of compliance. It is very 
tricky even to make a complaint about the system—if it 
backfires, whistle-blowing is even worse. 
The continuity of sistema is predicated upon compliance with informal 
signals, thus keeping the workings of sistema nontransparent and nonar-
ticulated. Most respondents in executive positions refer to constant 
monitoring of sistema as an absolute necessity. The monitoring func-
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tion (smotryashchie) is central for informal governance and should not 
be associated with some stereotypical security officers (siloviki) planted 
everywhere to watch over businesses or projects. Checks and balances 
of informal monitoring emerge from Putin’s networks watching over 
one another, just as in krugovaya poruka described above, and from their 
informal reporting. According to a well-informed respondent:
 
In reality, smotryashchie is not a single eye. It is a complex 
system. Where there is some money, there should be 
control. Putin controls manually. He does not trust anybody. 
There are checks and balances and there are trusted watch-
dogs . . . who have access to Putin through a private room 
in his office. Each of them has Putin’s ear, and in the end 
Putin gets a more or less adequate picture. He divides and 
rules in each constituency. He also uses nonsistema sources 
that we know nothing about. It is like the operative work of 
reading dossiers, morning security service reports, general 
country reports, and memos that come from almost every-
where. 
What makes people comply with informal signals? Fear for one’s 
safety, one’s career or business, complete distrust of the judicial system, 
and the insecurity this entails. Such feelings might be the source of 
sistema’s domination, but they are also the source of its vulnerabil-
ity: the frustration of insiders results in the “exit strategy” of national 
elites, legal nihilism, and individual and collective revolts. Sistema 
seems to transform its long-serving insiders in similar ways: they are 
becoming chronically dependent on sistema but also bitter about it, if 
not quite biting the hand that feeds. The ambivalence of sistema makes 
double standards and cynicism a survival strategy. By expressing bold-
ness while being insecure, enjoying impunity while living in fear, and 
exercising arbitrariness while being subject to rigid subordination, 
sistema insiders help reproduce the cage they are in. 
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meASurINg INformAl goVerNANCe
I argue that the use of informal instruments, or rather, the scale of their 
use, is what determines the distinctiveness of Russia’s power networks. 
In societies with more developed institutions than those in Russia—
say in France or Italy—the use of power networks is less of a necessity, 
on the one hand, and more guarded by institutionalized checks and 
balances on the other. The power networks seem also to be in place but 
their scale, significance, and effectiveness are different because their 
workings are restricted by institutions. In societies where formal insti-
tutions do not work to their full potential and where people rely on 
informal ways of getting things done, the leadership is bound to rely 
on the use of informal instruments as well. Leaders can only be leaders 
once they master and control the power networks. The manageability 
of power networks is often achieved with informal means and instru-
ments: appointing loyal people, giving business to affiliated firms, 
ensuring that resources are in trusted hands and that their property 
rights are to some extent reversible, and controlling the periphery all 
ensure submissiveness. 
The reverse side of the use of informal means and instruments 
is that the leader finds himself bound by informal and reciprocal ties. 
These bonds can function, as with Putin’s appointments, to enhance 
the power hierarchy (vertikal’) but also undermine it through those very 
channels that helped its creation. They help the leader to survive and 
to be financially sustainable but they also keep the leader hostage to 
his useful friends, allies, and sponsors. They ensure that the mediated 
contacts are supportive of the leadership and play a buffer role between 
the authorities and society, but they are also path dependent on the 
traditional forms of governance, not conducive for the development 
of institutions. To date, there is no way of measuring informal gover-
nance or monitoring its standard operating procedures. In this context, 
the modernization of institutions in Russia, as well as the creation of 
institutional avenues for checks and balances, is essential. But they can 
only occur with the concurrent modernization of power networks and 
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leaders’ self-monitoring and self-restraint in the use of instruments of 
informal governance. 
NoTeS
1. Transparency International’s annual index (CPI) measures the degree 
to which corruption is perceived to exist among a country’s public 
officials and politicians. It is a composite index, drawing on 17 surveys 
from 13 independent institutions, that has gathered the opinions 
of businesspeople and country analysts. The scores range from 10 
(squeaky clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). A score of 5 is the number TI 
considers the borderline figure distinguishing countries that do and 
do not have a serious corruption problem. The CPI index is available 
online at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/. 
2. The GCB 2013 conducted a survey of 114,000 people in 107 coun-
tries. Over 50 percent of people think that the state of corruption has 
deteriorated in the last two years. A reduction of corruption levels 
has been registered only in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Cambodia. 
Corruption levels correlate with distrust of political leadership and 
institutions. In Russia, 92 percent do not trust state officials, 89 
percent do not trust the police (this is despite 1.125 billion rubles 
spent for the police reform). This is closely followed by distrust of 
the courts—84 percent—and of the legislature—83 percent. The 
least corrupt, according to Russian citizens, are religious organiza-
tions—40 percent still think they are corrupt—and nongovernmen-
tal organizations—45 percent. 
3. The nonresponse rate on this question in Russia is low at 4 percent, 
in comparison to 8 percent in the United States and 9.5 percent in 
Germany. The sample was at least 1,000 respondents in a majority of 
countries.
4. A longer version of the analysis appeared in Ledeneva (2013), Can 
Russia Modernise? 
5. Some governments have sold offices to raise money. This was true, 
for example, of judicial positions in eighteenth-century France and 
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of commissions in the army and navy in most European countries in 
the nineteenth century. Since the vested rights of officeholders were 
an obstacle to reorganization and an impediment to efficiency, they 
were bought out or expropriated with compensation.
6. Unwritten rules should not be confused with informal constraints 
(defined by codes of conduct, norms of behavior and conventions, 
customs and traditions). Rather, they prescribe how both formal 
and informal constraints can be circumvented or partially enforced 
and imply a practical skill that can only be achieved through 
the experience of dealing with constraints. It is this practical 
mastery of the rules of the game that makes one an expert broker 
of sistema, capable of “navigating” between its formal and infor-
mal sets of rules and assessing the degree and likelihood of their 
enforcement. 
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